One of the most prominent of the public’s remembrances of the Great War is the famous “Taxis of the Marne,” in which hundreds of taxis were utilized to shuttle troops to the front in time for the climactic battle fought near Paris in the fall of 1914. These taxis have been romanticized in people’s memories while in truth the execution of the plan was full of errors and problems. This detail is just one of many that author Holger Herwig examines in his comprehensive narrative of World War I’s first major battle in his book The Marne, 1914, The Opening of World War I and the Battle that Changed the World.
In his prologue, Herwig states that the Battle of the Marne was the most decisive land battle of the 20th century. Its conclusion ushered in four years of war in the trenches. No other year compared to the final five months of 1914 in terms of death. Herwig then provides a superb recounting of the battle, but this time, from the perspective of the Germans, who initiated it. Herwig conducted a massive examination of German archives to tell his version of the story.
After a brief telling of the war’s origins, the author discusses the famous Schlieffen plan that provided the basic outline of the German onslaught. The plan called for a huge sweep through Belgium with overwhelming forces in the hopes of defeating France quickly before Russia could mobilize. Speed was of the essence as many knew a two-front war would be a difficult proposition for Germany. German forces proved up to the task, sweeping Belgian and French forces from their path in their drive towards Paris from the northeast. But, the author points out that not everything was going perfectly and there were problems developing.
First of all, there were missed opportunities to crush French armies, but several German commanders failed to act aggressively and pursue defeated enemies. French forces managed an orderly retreat, and many German leaders noticed there were too few guns and prisoners captured. In other words, tales of a complete German victory were not entirely truthful. More importantly, an offensive of this scale required tight command and control from the general staff. Imperial headquarters stayed far back in the rear and Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke was not up to the task. He failed miserably and would be a broken man who would be relieved shortly afterwards.
Conversely, French leader Joseph Joffre did successfully manage his forces. After pushing the offensive along other fronts during the campaign, he quickly shifted troops to counter the greatest threat that was converging from the northeast. After gathering sufficient force, he counterattacked all along the line from Paris to Verdun. These offensives became the Battle of the Marne. And then, according to Herwig, one of the great mysteries of the war took place.
Colonel Richard Hentsch of the German High Command visited the front to report on matters to high command, but he was also given the ability to order troop movements himself from Moltke. Upon arrival at the 2nd army led by Karl von Bülow, he expressed concern over his observations of German troops and a gap in the line between the 2nd and 1st armies. For years afterwards, many Germans would cast blame upon Hentsch for ordering a retreat, making him a scapegoat for the German failure to win the Great War. In reality, Bülow himself ordered the pull back. Herwig believes nothing necessitated this retreat and that the men of the German 1st and 2nd armies deserved to have the offensive play out. This pullback eventually led to a wholesale German withdrawal to lines that eventually became the stationary trench line of the Western Front for the remainder of the war.
Herwig’s narrative is strong throughout, guiding the reader through various battles during the months of August and September 1914. Only minuscule and faded maps prevented this reader from gaining a complete understanding of where actions were taking place. Herwig’s epilogue, however, is his strongest part of the book. In it the author makes several strong conclusions such as praising Joffre and casting blame on Molkte. He also casts aspersions on the British Expeditionary Force which acted timidly and failed to make a strong impact on the campaign. Herwig states the battle ended the war of maneuver and that Germany failed to deliver a knockout blow, although it had opportunities, and set the stage for four years of horror along the trenches. Herwig closes with an assertion that the failure of the results of the Marne to lead to any sort of conclusion and set the stage for the eventual catastrophe of 1939-1945. While perhaps this is reaching too far, The Marne, 1914 deserves to be read by anyone interested in the world wars and allows readers to determine for themselves if the Marne was truly the most significant battle of the 20th century.
CPW