The recent bicentennial of the War of 1812 has led to an outburst of new studies of our nation’s least understood conflict. Published in cooperation with the Battle of New Orleans Bicentennial Commission, The War of 1812: Conflict and Deception, The British Attempt to Seize New Orleans and Nullify the Louisiana Purchase by Ronald Drez seeks to dispel many myths of the war, specifically dealing with the final campaign to capture the crescent city. In this account, Drez provides a solid overview of the war and makes quite a few strong statements.
One of the book’s strongest points is its emphasis on the British impressment of U.S. sailors being the main cause of war between the nations. Most War of 1812 studies cover this topic, but few have emphasized it with enough evidence that displays the lengths the British Navy underwent to collect sailors without any regard to the rights of other nations. The British Crown simply considered it their inalienable right and Drez includes ample proof including the famous Chesapeake-Leopard affair as well as others. I doubt anyone reading this account will feel that the British disrespect for the United States was not a strong enough reason to go to war. This nation had to challenge this affront to our sovereignty!!
Drez’s account continues with an overview of the war with interludes dealing with attempts to obtain peace through treaty negotiations. Drez discusses British attempts to sidetrack negotiations by not either dealing with the primary issue of impressment and later on, adding language to the final treaty that inserted the key word of “possessions.” Great Britain considered the entire Louisiana Purchase to be illegal and felt the United States did not have legitimate claim to the land and hoped via conquest to gain it back for Spain, its rightful owner. (Of course, returning the land back to Spain meant in reality that the British would control it.) British commander Edward Pakenham was given strict instructions not to halt operations in his attack on New Orleans on rumor of any treaty signings and instead wait until confirmation that a treaty was actually ratified by the two nations. Great Britain hoped to capture the city beforehand and nullify the purchase of the entire territory. This book’s main goal is to dismiss once and for all the myth that the Battle of New Orleans was not important at all since it occurred after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.
This book only provides a quick overview of the military campaigns of the War of 1812, but the narrative gets into greater detail in regards to the New Orleans campaign. Drez does, in my opinion, heap proper praise on Andrew Jackson’s daring December 23 attack, where he states, “in fewer than five hours from the first alert, he (Jackson) had gathered his widely scattered forces, formulated a complicated plan for a daring night attack against an unknown number of enemy, issued orders to key commanders of land and naval forces, moved to the battlefield undetected, and seized the initiative in a surprise attack . . .” Drez also seeks to dispel another myth in dealing with the West Bank component of the main battle on January 8. There have been debates on whether U.S. forces spiked the guns upon retreating. Drez is confident they were spiked, meaning the British forces could not have trained those guns on Jackson’s main line on the opposite side of the river, negating any possible bigger success on that side of the river for the British.
Drez ends his book with praise for the men of the 1927 Tennessee Commission who first tried to refute the idea that New Orleans did not impact the outcome of the war. Drez hopes his book will finally end that argument and again place the significance of New Orleans back where it was initially, when January 8 was celebrated just as much as July 4. Drez states that at one time January 8 and July 4 were the only two national holidays. January 8 has lost its appeal to the mainstream of America and this book unfortunately probably won’t help.
CPW