“I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky,” is just one of Abraham Lincoln’s memorable quotes. Although sometimes regarded as comical, the remark addressed the critical importance of the Bluegrass state for both the Union and Confederate forces. Southern troops abandoned Kentucky in early 1862 following a string of defeats, but the fall presented the Confederacy an opportunity to reverse the tide of war and reclaim Kentucky. James Lee McDonough describes these events in a fast-moving narrative in his War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville.
After the crucial battle of Shiloh and capture of Corinth, Mississippi, Union General Henry Halleck faced a choice of several options, any of which would impact the immediate course of the war. He could marshal his forces and attack the important river city at Vicksburg or press the defeated Confederate forces at Tupelo. Instead of these aggressive moves, Halleck opted to strengthen his supply lines and move Don Carlos Buell’s army towards Chattanooga. Lincoln, always concerned with East Tennessee and the plight of the large loyal population there, was pleased, but many historians have since assented that Halleck missed an opportunity and more importantly, yielded the initiative to the Confederate forces. Braxton Bragg quickly transported his troops via rail to Chattanooga to plan an offensive operation with Kirby Smith into Kentucky. The prospects appeared bright for the Confederates, but like in so many cases in the war’s western theater, looks could be deceiving.
The seeds of failure had been planted when Smith and Bragg failed to establish a unified command or clearly defined military objectives. Smith and Bragg’s forces were supposed to unite as they maneuvered northward, but Smith’s forces proceeded alone. Smith never seemed to want to place his men under Bragg’s command. Smith’s army did win one of the Confederacy’s most complete victories of the war at Richmond, Kentucky, but rather than try to unite with Bragg, he proceeded to Lexington where he hoped to arm thousands of eager Kentuckians for the Confederate cause. Bragg’s men moved through Tennessee and into Kentucky, winning a small affair on the railroad at Munfordville. Here, Bragg also faced a critical decision. His force stood astrideBuell’s supply line to Louisville so he could have held his ground and forced Buell to attack. He could have chosen to march against Louisville itself or try to move towards Smith so they could unite forces. He chose the latter. Again, without any real plan of action, the only objective Smith and Bragg seemed to share was gathering Kentucky troops. McDonough hits hard on their lack of specific goals as being the paramount reason for the campaign’s dismal results.
McDonough is at his best in providing analysis of the commanders and their decisions, whether it is his own or reminding us of those of other historians. Besides faulting the poor Confederate command structure and lack of objectives, he also analyzes Buell’s actions. He faults Buell’s lack of aggressiveness at several turns where decisive action might have meant victory. For instance, he could have moved his forces to block Bragg’s path towards Kentucky, but instead chose to head to Nashville instead. He also points out the many faults of Confederate general Leonidas Polk for not following orders and provides a quote from Bragg biographer Grady McWhiney who stated “Polk probably had been a bishop too long to be a successful subordinate.”
As the armies came together in the sleepy town of Perryville as they searched for water during a particularly dry season, Buell had an overwhelming numerical superiority and yet only a fraction of his men saw action. The dreaded natural phenomenon known as acoustic shadow prevented the sound of battle from reaching his headquarters a relatively short distance off, but this does not fully explain how Bragg’s men were allowed to maul a lone Union corps while thousands of Federals were within easy distance of providing assistance. In terms of major Civil War battles, Perryville is one of the smaller ones, but McDonough provides plenty of first-hand accounts attesting to its ferocity. Famed Confederate private Sam Watkins, who fought in almost every battle in the Western Theater and later wrote one of the most-quoted accounts of the war, claimed he was never in “a harder contest and more evenly fought battle than that at Perryville.” Bragg eventually saw he was outnumbered and pulled out. Buell’s lack of aggressiveness eventually cost him his command as Lincoln replaced him shortly afterward.
McDonough states that Bragg’s decision to abandon the campaign after Perryville rather than unite with Smith was another strategic choice which contributed to Confederate failure in Kentucky. Bragg was disheartened with the low numbers of Kentuckians who joined his army and with concerns over supply and the safety of Chattanooga, decided to head south. The grand campaign had concluded without any tangible results for the Confederacy except casualties that could not be replaced and a serious lack of trust in Bragg by his soldiers.
The Confederate Kentucky offensive was one of three in the fall of 1862. Bragg had left Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price in Mississippi with hopes they would march into Tennessee. Those dreams were dashed at Corinth. And of course, Robert E. Lee led the most famous campaign that was halted at Antietam. The Confederate high tide of the fall of 1862 was over once each of these advances were turned back. Interestingly enough, McDonough ends the book with a discussion of Lee fighting at Gettysburg. His point is Lee was trying to win a dramatic victory to overcome the multitude of Confederate defeats in the western theater, defeats that could never be overcome. Lee has been criticized for this maneuver, but McDonough seems to think it was the Confederacy’s best shot by the summer of 1863 considering the string of irreconcilable failures out west. A campaign of complex maneuverings over hundreds of miles of terrain with commanders having to make several critical decisions makes this Civil War campaign one of the more fascinating of the war. McDonough carefully guides the reader through it all, in well-written prose. Antietam gets all the headlines in the fall of 1862, but War in Kentucky makes it clear that it should share the spotlight with events in the Bluegrass.
CPW/JMB