The Confederacy was built on the institution of slavery. Regardless of the well-documented individual motivations of those who fought in its armies and the fact that a majority of Southern soldiers held no slaves of their own, the people of the South could scarcely have imagined an independent Southern nation devoid of slavery. The labor system was part and parcel of the very idea of the Confederacy, a basic part of life in the region, at the root cause of secession, and, as the war dragged on, became one of the fundamental questions about American government and society which were to be decided by the conflict. In working to preserve the institution, Confederate authorities leveraged that unique source of manpower in almost every way it could during the long, consuming war it waged for its independence. It relied on slave-based agricultural production to help keep its armies in the field, drafted slaves into service as laborers to construct many of its defensive positions, drew heavily upon slave labor in moving and supplying its armies, and in the waning days of the war actually seriously considered pressing them into service as soldiers.

The question of whether or not to arm slaves was one of the most tortured of debates of the war for the South, and its mere existence reveals the desperate straits in which the Confederacy found itself in the conflict’s last year. How and why it came about, the degree to which the idea found acceptance among Confederate leadership, and the ultimate half-hearted implementation of the effort in the last days of the war are all part of one of the most fascinating but little understood aspects of any study of the Confederacy. Here to chronicle it is historian Bruce Levine in Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to free and Arm Slaves During the Civil War. Levine is an award winning professor emeritus of history at University of Illinois and author of several notable books, including The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil War & the Social Revolution that Transformed the South and Half Slave & Half Free: The Roots of Civil War. As a serious and well-regarded historian, he is well positioned to undertake the study of the controversial subject at the core of Confederate Emancipation. This is an important point to make clear in evaluating the book, for there is a virtual cottage industry still advancing the crackpot notion that blacks in significant numbers willingly aided the Confederate cause. Levine’s work, in contrast, is a piece of credible scholarship which provides a thorough and well-documented treatment of the Confederate plans to arms slaves, such as they were.
The book reveals the circuitous path to the actual passage of an act by the Confederate congress in March of 1865 formally allowing the enrollment of slaves as soldiers. It was passed by the narrowest of margins by a legislative body in desperate circumstances. While it sounds revolutionary on the surface, in truth it offered no promise of emancipation and was so contentious and half-baked that it yielded almost no results. Only a few dozen black recruits, primarily hospital orderlies in Richmond, were somehow coerced into the first company of black soldier trainees in the last days of the war but not enrolled in the regular army. There service record is vague indeed. If the Confederacy had a potential source of untapped manpower in the form of millions of slaves at its disposal, though, then why did it take so long to produce such a weak effort at utilizing them in its bid for independence? The answer is obvious, as revealed throughout Levine’s book in an avalanche of testimony from citizens, soldiers, and political leaders. The Confederacy simply could not come to terms with the idea of black soldiers, for it called into question some of the foundational principles on which the nation was built. Even as it faced certain defeat and ruin, the idea of giving up slavery was too much for most.
This does not mean that there were not Southerners who urged sacrificing slavery, or at least freeing some slaves, for independence. Seeing the thousands of blacks, the majority of which were former slaves, flocking to Union arms as the war progressed, many concluded that if the South did not find a way to use them in their armies they would surely be used against them. Those making such arguments were always a distinct minority, but there numbers grew as the war went on, and to read some of their thoughts will strike contemporary readers as bizarre indeed. General Patrick Cleburne famously endorsed the idea in 1863, but endured only ridicule for his outspokenness at first. In the last months of the war, however, the idea of black Confederate soldiers was endorsed by figures such as General Robert E. Lee, General Richard S. Ewell, Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin, and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, along with several other prominent leaders.
Their endorsement was, as a rule, tepid and highly conditional, though. Few were bold enough to admit that if individual slaves could be enticed to fight for the South, they would surely have to be offered their freedom as a prize. But what about their family members? How could they be asked to fight to keep their kinsmen enslaved? How were owners to be compensated if they were freed? What would keep them from turning arms on their fellow Southerners to free other blacks by force once armed? None of these questions were addressed clearly, and in fact led to some rather convoluted arguments in which some seemed to advance the theory that slaves would fight without freedom or that if some were freed as a matter of convenience that the institution could remain in place after the war even though fundamentally altered and surely set on a path towards eventual extinction. What is perhaps most interesting to see in the debate over whether or not to attempt to use slaves as soldiers is that those endorsing the plan were simultaneously admitting that enslaved individuals were indeed able to be trained as soldiers and willing to choose to lay their lives on the line in exchange for their freedom. This of course flies into the face of the narrative of the content, incompetent, slave on which Southerners had so long deluded themselves. To read how the debate of all these questions played out in the wartime South is fascinating for anyone desiring a better understanding of Southern society during the war, and revealing of some uncomfortable truths about the ideals of the Confederacy which we still wrestle with today.
Confederate Emancipation is nonetheless a relatively tedious and slow-moving read which is less chronological narrative than thorough topical analysis. Levine essentially covers every angle of the internal debate over the idea of Southern slave-soldiers by explaining how the concept was viewed from multiple perspectives and the ways in which it was presented. He tracks the debate as it played out in newspapers, private correspondence, and legislative records in what is without doubt the most complete chronicle of this particular subject to be published. It is a solid contribution to our collective understanding of the Southern war effort and a definitive statement on its subject.
JMB